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DAUBERT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW: HOW DOES AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY
DISTINGUISH VALID SCIENCE FROM JUNK SCIENCE?
by
D. Hiep Truong*
I. INTRODUCTION
In regulating the nation’s health, regulatory agencies must often make
risk assessments based on scientific paradigms that are incomplete at best and
questionable at worst. Substantive review of agency decision making is the
only assurance that agencies are basing their decisions on valid and legitimate
scientific evidence.1 The rebuttal to this argument is that although regulatory
agencies make educated predictions based on the best available scientific
resources and evidence, these predictions are naturally going to be incomplete
as agencies are given general grants of authority to fulfill their broad statutory
mandates.
Furthermore, it is far better to preempt any harms that underregulation
would present to the public’s health, and err on the side of overregulation.
While this is certainly true and equally valid, the move away from a harm-based
to a risk-based standard for regulatory action greatly expanded the agencies’
decision making authority. The agencies’ mandate to assess risk has greatly
*

B.B.A., University of California at Berkeley (1994); J.D., Santa Clara University School of Law
(1999). The author would like to thank Professor Gary Widman for all of his helpful
comments, patience, and legal repartee while teaching Administrative Law. In addition, the
author expresses his appreciation and gratitude to the staff of the Akron Law Review for all
its help.
1
Judge Learned Hand, in his opinion in N.L.R.B. v. Standard Oil Co., 138 F.2d 885, 887 (2d Cir.
1943), noted that:
That there can be issues of fact which courts would be altogether
incompetent to decide, is plain. If the question were, for example, as
to the chemical reaction between a number of elements, it would be
idle to give power to a court to pass upon whether there was
‘substantial’ evidence to support the decision of a board of qualified
chemists. The court might undertake to review their finding so far as
they had decided what reagents had actually been present in the
experiment, for that presumably would demand no specialized skill.
But it would be obliged to stop there, for it would not have the
background which alone would enable it to decide questions of
chemistry; and indeed it could undertake to pass upon them only at
the cost of abandoning the accumulated store of experience upon the
subject.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2000

1

Akron Law Review, Vol. 33 [2000], Iss. 3, Art. 2

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:3

expanded the available sources of evidence from which administrators could
base their decision making and with which they could characterize as
dangerous, or presenting a level of risk that is unacceptable. These sources
of evidence, however, may either be from scientific or nonscientific sources.
This broad authority to assess risk, however, leaves too much
discretion to administrative agencies. Even more disturbing is the fact that
different agencies assess the same risks differently, which leads to inconsistent
results. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), for example, in
determining the cancer risks from pesticides on food, produced an estimated
risk of cancer mortality ten times greater than the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA).2 To use a law and economics model, valuing equivalent
(or identical) risks differently leaves open the possibility of economic
misallocation.3 For example, if one agency has determined the proper level of
risk, and assuming that both agencies must regulate the risk to reduce it to its
optimal level, the second agency is either over- or under-regulating.4
If an agency over-regulates, the agency is merely addressing a threat
whose benefits are so marginal that the spending no longer justifies the cost of
the additional regulation.5 But if an agency under-regulates, potential lives
may be lost that could have been saved by more regulation.6 Unless agencies
recognize that inconsistencies may occur if they fail to examine their
regulations in a broader context, an agencies’ regulation of one environmental
risk may actually increase the danger posed by a collateral risk.7 For example,
if an agency decides to close a nuclear power plant to reduce the risk of
radiation poisoning, there may actually be an increase in the potential damage
from acid rain as people burn more fossil fuels to compensate for the nuclear
power plant closing.8
Agencies have certainly proved to be more susceptible to political
influences than the judiciary.9 Furthermore, members from the various
2

Michael Gough, How much Cancer Can the EPA Regulate Away? 10 Risk Analysis 1, 4 at
table 2. The EPA’s estimation of total cancer risks (3,000 cancer deaths from an incidence of
6,000 cancer cases) still exceeded the FDA’s (only 300 cancer deaths) by 13-30 percent.
3
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, 63 U.CHI.L.REV. 1533, 1543-49
(1996).
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id. at 1540.
8
Id.
9
See, e.g. National Coalition Against the Misuse of Pesticides v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 809 F.2d 875 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (When the EPA set a zero tolerance level for EDB
(Ethylene dibromide), a chemical that has been shown to increase the risks of cancer, on
September 1, 1985, the EPA immediately “received entreaties from the State Department and
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regulatory agencies are appointed for limited terms and serve at the pleasure
of the Executive. Often based on methods of data collection which are untried
or novel, and often based on a cross-disciplinary interpretive judgments,
agency risk assessments generally lacked the institutional credibility of normal
science. To industries which are subject to oversight by various administrative
agencies—such as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), and the Consumer
Product Safety Commission (CPSC) to name only a few—these interpretations
of scientific evidence are not trivial, as their determinations of risk usually entail
costly restructuring of industry standards in order to comply with the new
regulations that are based on the agency’s interpretation of risk.
But, proponents of independent agency decision making argue judges
should only be restricted to review agency decision making if it is based on
pure questions of law. As Judge Bazelon has noted, judges are on firmer
ground when reviewing issues of administrative law involving issues of
individual rights and liberty when undertaking a substantive review of agency
action, but are on shakier grounds when reviewing the technical merits of an
agency’s decision making.10 Moreover, judges are ill-equipped to review the
agencies’ expertise, and therefore, should defer to an administrative agencies’
decision making.11 However, given the over two decades of the federal “Hard
Look” at agency rule making, if there really was a threat of judicial substitution
of judgment, there would have been evidence of it.12 Moreover, at the federal

the Department of Agriculture to reconsider its newly imposed ban. Among the importunings
were letters from John Whitehead, Deputy Secretary of State, and James Michel, Acting
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs. The Whitehead-Michel communications
reiterated the adverse economic impact on friendly countries occasioned by EPA’s ban on
EDB-fumigated mangoes . . . On November 27, 1985, EPA did an about-face. The agency
proposed to abandon the zero tolerance and revive the expired 30 ppb tolerance through at
least September 30, 1986.” Id. at 876-77. Based on this, Starr, Circuit Judge, concluded that
the EPA acted “arbitrarily and capriciously in reinstating the 30 parts per billion tolerance for
ethylene dibromide in imported mangoes.” Id. at 880).
10
See International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
11
See SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE , AND TECHNOLOGY IN
AMERICA 43 (1995), at 43. (“[l]egal institutions and procedures for dealing with
technical evidence have remained remarkably static. Most U.S. judges are still
generalists, without any special schooling in the sciences, and practices such as
random assignment of cases prevent judicial specialization in areas requiring technical
knowledge.”).
12
Frank E. Cooper, Administrative Law: The Substantial Evidence Rule, 44 A.B.A.J. 945, 947
(1958). The author notes that: “The cases studied [188 federal court of appeals cases
between 1951 and 1958] vindicate the rule-of-thumb test commonly employed by practicing
attorneys, viz: if the appellant can convince the appellate court that the administrative
findings of facts is obviously just plain wrong, and if the appellant can at the same time
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level, there is a significant body of scholarship which rigorously examines the
effect of judicial review of agency rule making.13
The need for more rigorous review of risk assessment determinations
by an agency simply boils down to this: cost. If an agency is allowed to rely on
various sources of information, both scientific and nonscientific, riskassessment based regulations run the risk of spinning out of control and
wreaking havoc on the economy. Without fear of having to justify its sources of
“scientific” evidence, an agency has virtual carte-blanche powers with respect
to its determinations of risk. Without any substantive criteria for assessing the
validity of the scientific sources used by agencies, agencies may naturally
succumb to pressures that they “err on the side of overprotection”14 and,
moreover, “[e]specially at the margin, where costs skyrocket in relation to
benefits, the United States had misdirected or inefficiently expended many
hundreds of billions of dollars in pursuit of environmental, health and safety
protection.”15 As Justice Breyer has accurately noted:
Tunnel vision, a classic administrative disease, arises when an
agency . . .effectively carries single-minded pursuit of a single
goal too far, to the point where it brings about more harm than
good . . . The regulating agency considers a substance that
poses serious risks, at least through long exposure to high
doses. It then promulgates standards so stringent—insisting,
for example, upon rigidly strict site cleanup requirements—that
the regulatory action ultimately imposes high costs without
achieving significant additional safety benefits. A former EPA

arouse the court with a zealous desire to correct the error, the court can always find means to
do so, whatever labels must be applied.” However, as the authors of the case book
accurately note, courts are reluctant to review an agency’s findings because “[a]gencies
specialize and develop expertise in the areas they regulate. Their fact-finding process reflects
that expertise, and thus their findings should receive only limited judicial scrutiny.” See
M ICHAEL ASIMOW ET AL., STATE AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 546 (2d ed. 1998), at 546.
13
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, On the Costs and Benefits of Aggressive Judicial Review of
Agency Action, 1989 DUKE L.J. 522; Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the
Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J.
984, 986; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Two Problems in Administrative Law: Political Polarity
on the District of Columbia Circuit and Judicial Deterrence of Agency Rulemaking,
1988 DUKE L.J. 300, 301; Peter L. Strauss, Considering Political Alternatives to “Hard
Look” Review, 1989 DUKE L.J. 538, 539; R. MELNICK , REGULATION AND THE COURTS:
THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT (1983); M. S HAPIRO, W HO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS ?
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION (1988).
14
R. SHEP MELNICK , REGULATION AND THE COURTS 295 (1983).
15
See Edward W. Warren & Gary M. Marchant, “More Good Than Harm”: A First Principle
for Environmental Agencies and Reviewing Courts, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 379, 380-81 (1993).
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administrator put the problem succinctly when he noted that
about 95 percent of the toxic material could be removed from
waste sites within a few months, but years are spent trying to
remove the last little bit. Removing that last little bit can involve
limited technological choice, high costs, devotion of
considerable agency resources, large legal fees, and endless
argument.16
Upon judicial review, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides
that courts shall “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and
conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law . . . .”17 In fact, as it stands today, a
federal litigant18 is subjected to a more rigorous standard if he or she wants to
introduce novel scientific evidence into court, insofar as the trial court is bound
by the court’s ruling in Daubert.19
Risk assessment is used by agencies to lay a foundation for the
decisions that they reach. Risk assessment, then, operates in a manner that is
similar to expert testimony: ie. helping the factfinder to make an appropriate
determination of fact. In the words of Federal Rules of Evidence 702, risk
assessment is there to “assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
determine the fact in issue.”20 Daubert provides the judiciary with a check on
agency decision making, while at the same time increasing the agency’s
credibility, consistency, and accuracy with respect to its reliance on scientific
evidence.

16

See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK
REGULATION, 11 (1993).
17
5 U.S.C. 701 et seq. (1994); 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A)(1994).
18
See Alfred A. Brenner et al., Technical Knockout: On the Difference Between Valid
Scientific Evidence and “Junk,” LOS A NGELES DAILY JOURNAL, March 31, 1999 at 6. (The
authors accurately note the current state of affairs in the federal courts: “It is essential that
attorneys have the capability to determine what evidence is based on sound science and
what is “junk” science—and to explain the difference to a jury . . . Counsel must question
whether opinions are based on sound scientific evidence. Experts should supply references,
published in a respected, peer-reviewed journal, corroborating their opinions.”).
19
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). (“Daubert exists because the
justice system cannot take on faith that when experts say the evidence supports their
conclusions, it must be true. Very often, through statistical manipulation, selective analysis
of results or just plain faulty data, conclusions are reached that may be inaccurate or a
stretch. This method of manipulating data to support a hypothesis is sometimes kindly
referred to in the business as ‘hand-waving.’” See Alfred A. Brenner et al., supra note 18, at
6.).
20
FED. R. EVID. 702.
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This Comment, then, examines the possibility of using the Daubert
standard to effectuate a more meaningful judicial review of an agency’s
determination of risk. By using the Daubert standards, a reviewing court is
simply treating an agency like a testifying expert. When an agency is justifying
its determination of the level of risk to courts, they must offer evidence from the
record from which a reviewing court can examine the nexus between the
evidence that is relied upon and the ultimate decision reached by the agency.
II. BACKGROUND

A. The Origin of the Substantive Administrative Review Debate: The LeventhalBazelon Debate
The judiciary’s dilemma, whether to defer to an administrative agency’s
expertise, or to subject such agency decision making to more rigorous review,
can best be illustrated by the lively exchange between Judge Leventhal and
Judge Bazelon in International Harvester v. Ruckelshaus.21 At issue in the
case was whether the EPA had erred in rejecting a request by the auto industry
to suspend the one-year tailpipe emission standards set by Congress to
control smog.22 In reversing the Administrator’s decision to deny the auto
industry’s request for the one-year tailpipe suspension, the Court, per
Leventhal, concluded that it was “troubled by arguments advanced by [the auto
industry] that the methodology used by the Administrator in reaching his
conclusions . . . was inconsistent with that of the [National Academy of
Sciences]. It was our view that if and to the extent that such differences existed
they should be explained by EPA, in order to aid us in determining whether the
Administrator’s conclusion . . . rested on a reasoned basis.”23
Concurring in the result, Chief Judge Bazelon disagreed with the
judiciary’s role in reviewing such complex agency decision making, noting that
he could not “believe that Congress intended this court to delve into the
substance of the mechanical, statistical, and technological disputes in this
case."24 Bazelon would have clearly deferred to the administrative agency’s
21

International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
Id. at 621 (“Congress was aware that these 1975 standards were ‘drastic medicine,’
designed to ‘force the state of the art.’ There was . . . concern whether the manufacturers
would be able to achieve this goal. Therefore, Congress provided, in Senator Baker’s phrase,
a ‘realistic escape hatch’: the manufacturers could petition the Administrator of the EPA for a
one-year suspension of the 1975 requirements, and Congress took the precaution of directing
the National Academy of Sciences to undertake an ongoing study of the feasibility of
compliance with the emission standards.”) Id. at 623.).
23
Id. at 627.
24
Id. at 651.
22
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expertise, noting that the court’s “proper role is to see to it that the agency
provides ‘a framework for principled decision-making.’ . . . [b]ut in cases of
great technological complexity, the best way for courts to guard against
unreasonable or erroneous administrative decisions is not for the judges
themselves to scrutinize the technical merits of each decision. Rather, it is to
establish a reasoned decision that can be held up to the scrutiny of the
scientific community and the public.”25
Judge Bazelon strenuously argued against any sort of substantive
review of an agency’s decision making in matters of scientific complexity, noting
that
where administrative decisions on scientific issues are
concerned, it makes no sense to rely upon the courts to
evaluate the agency’s scientific and technological
determinations; and there is perhaps even less reason for the
courts to substitute their own value preferences for those of the
agency, to which the legislature has presumably delegated the
decisional power and responsibility . . . [t]he agencies
themselves will usually be in the best position to determine
which particular procedures, or combinations of procedures,
are best suited to a particular issue.26
Three years after International Harvester was decided, the D.C. Circuit
had another chance to review an agency’s decision making, and this time,
Judge Bazelon’s position seemed to gain ground. In Ethyl Corp. v. EPA,27 the
Court upheld the EPA’s lead-in-gasoline regulations. Once again, Chief Judge
Bazelon argued, as in International Harvester, that “substantive review of
mathematical and scientific evidence by technically illiterate judges is
dangerously unreliable,”28 and he believed that the judiciary’s role is to
“improve administrative decision making by concentrating our efforts on
strengthening administrative procedures.”29 Judge Leventhal notes that Judge
Bazelon’s position is actually “no substantive review at all, whenever the
substantive issues at stake involve technical matters that the judges involved
consider beyond their individual technical competence.”30 Judge Leventhal
noted that “[t]he aim of the judges is not to exercise expertise or decide
25

Id. at 652.
David L. Bazelon, Coping With Technology Through the Legal Process, 62 CORNELL L.
REV. 817, 822-823 (1977). (Judge Bazelon noted that judges are, for the most part,
“technically illiterate,” and includes himself in that category.).
27
Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (1976).
28
Id. at 67.
29
Id.
30
Id. at 68.
26
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technical questions, but simply to gain sufficient background information . . .
individual judges have had to acquire the learning pertinent to complex
technical questions in such fields as economics, science, technology and
psychology.”31 As it stands today, a court, upon review of an agency’s
decisionmaking on matters of scientific expertise, is more likely to exhibit
deference.32 In order to understand the context from which an agency’s
decisionmaking is structured, we must first examine the concept of risk
assessment, as agencies rely heavily on this method when determining risk
regulations.
1. What is Risk Assessment?
Risk regulation is comprised of two steps: risk assessment and riskbenefit analysis. Agencies, during risk assessment, make a determination of
the level of danger a threat poses to the environment. Risk assessment is the
“use of the factual base to define the health effects of exposure of individuals
or populations to hazardous materials and situations . . . [and the] qualitative
assessment or hazard identification part of risk assessment contains a review
of the relevant biological and chemical information bearing on whether or not
an agent may pose a carcinogenic hazard.”33 According to the National
Research Council, risk assessment includes several elements:

31

Id.
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. National Resources Defense Council Inc., 435 U.S.
519 (1978) (rejecting Judge Bazelon’s suggestion of improving administrative agency
decisionmaking by imposing procedural safeguards, noting that judicial imposition of
procedures on the agency is contrary to the Administrative Procedures Act); Baltimore Gas &
Elec. Co. v. National Resources Defense Council Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983) (noting that a
reviewing court should be “at its most deferential” when an agency has made a decision on
“the frontiers of science.” Id.); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (the court noted that if a “statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue (the agency must decide), the question for the court is whether
the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”); See also 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), which permits an agency’s action to be set aside by a reviewing court only
if the action is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with the law.” An “arbitrary and capricious decision exists where an agency has relied on
factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an
important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to
the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a
difference in view or the product of the agency expertise.” Von Eye v. United States, 92 F.3d
681, 685 (8th Cir. 1996).
33
See National Resource Council (NRC), RISK A SSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT :
M ANAGING THE PROCESS 3, 18 (1983) (cited in Flue-Cured Tobacco Coop. Stabilization Corp. v.
United States Environmental Protection Agency, 4 F. Supp. 2d 435, 440 (M.D. N.C. 1998)).
32
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[D]escription of the potential adverse health effects based on
an evaluation of results of epidemiologic, clinical, toxicologic,
and environmental research; extrapolation from those results to
predict the type and estimate the extent of health effects in
humans under given conditions of exposure; judgements as to
the number and characteristics of persons exposed at various
intensities and durations; and summary judgments on the
existence and overall magnitude of the public-health problem.
Risks assessment also includes characterization of the
uncertainties inherent in the process of inferring risk.34
Once the determination of risk assessment is made, agencies move
onto risk-benefit analysis, which measures the benefits of regulation against
the cost of imposing it.35 Risk assessment is usually divided into four stages.36
First, the agency performs a hazard identification, which determines whether
the exposure to a potentially toxic agent threatens human health. Second, the
agency performs a dose-response assessment, which relates the dose of the
toxin to its adverse health effects.37 Third, the agency then performs an
34

Id. at 18 (cited in Flue-Cured Tobacco at 4 F. Supp. 2d at 441).
See M URRAY L. W EIDENBAUM , BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT IN THE GLOBAL
MARKETPLACE 215 (5TH ed. 1995). The need for a searching regulatory analysis of
agency decisionmaking is aptly noted by Professor Weidenbaum:
The motive for incorporating benefit-cost analysis into public decision
making is to lead to a more efficient allocation of government
resources by subjecting the public sector to the same types of
quantitative constraints as those in the private sector . . . [t]he
government agency decision maker, however, usually does not face
such constraints. If the costs to society of an action by an agency
exceed the benefits, that situation has no immediate adverse impact
on the agency, as would be the case if the private business
executive makes a bad investment decision . . . [i]n requiring
agencies to perform benefit-cost analysis, the aim is to make the
government’s decision-making process more effective, eliminating
those regulatory actions for which net benefits are negative.”
Id. at 215. Otherwise known as Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA), much has been written
on the topic. See also, THOMAS O. M CGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF
REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY (1991); Richard H. Pildes & Cass
R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U.CHI.L.REV. 1, 43-95 (1995).
36
M ARK BOROUSH, UNDERSTANDING RISK ANALYSIS: A SHORT GUIDE FOR HEALTH,
SAFETY, AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY MAKING 18-19 (INTERNET ED 1998).
37
Id. at 19. (“For example, an anesthetic may cause headaches at low doses, a medically
advantageous sleep at higher doses, but is lethal at very high doses . . . [w]ith
noncarcinogens . . . the normal working assumption . . . is that biological effects occur only
after a threshold level of exposure has been exceeded. Various thresholds have come to be
35

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2000

9

Akron Law Review, Vol. 33 [2000], Iss. 3, Art. 2

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:3

exposure assessment, which estimates the possible intensity, frequency, and
duration of human exposure to the toxin.38 Finally, the agency generates a risk
characterization, which estimates the incidence of adverse health effects under
various exposure conditions.39
The sources of evidence with which an agency could theoretically base
its decision making is vast, as the following non-exclusive list will make clear:
epidemiologic studies, toxicological studies, structure-activity studies, exposure
data and exposure modeling, as well as research on metabolism,
pharmacokinetics, and the mechanisms of toxicity.40 The problems associated
with deferring to an agency’s expertise on matters of risk assessment
frequently involve “exceedingly complex analyses, with much judgmental
weighing of diverse data; it is vulnerable to limitations in data and to
uncertainties in scientific reasoning; and it requires a good many assumptions,
at least some of which will be debatable.”41
According to the National Resource Council, the uncertainties
inherent in risk assessment can be grouped in two general
categories: missing or ambiguous information on a particular
substance and gaps in current scientific theory. When
scientific uncertainty is encountered in the risk assessment
process, inferential bridges are needed to allow the process to
continue . . . The judgments made by the scientist/risk
assessor for each component of risk assessment often entail a
choice among several scientifically plausible options; the
Committee has designated these inference options.42
Even those who otherwise advocate the use of risk assessment by
agencies, acknowledge its shortcomings, noting that “[t]he current state of

established; they include a lowest observable effect level (LOEL), the smallest dose that
causes any detectable effect; a no-observed-effect level (NOEL), the dose at or below which
no biological effects of any type are detected; and a no-observed-adverse-effect level
(NOAEL), the dose at or below which no harmful effects are detected.”) Id.
38
Id. at 19-20.
39
Id. at 20.
40
Id. at 20-23.
41
Id. at 23. (Boroush also points to other problems associated with risk assessment: “(1) The
high (in terms of level or duration) exposures used in the standard animal test designs usually
have no parallel in humans, thus creating the need for extrapolations to levels outside that
verifiable by experimental data (a situation science shies from). (2) The high exposures may
provide a misleading picture of the potential for health effects, because it is possible that the
high doses induce effects that do not arise at lower doses. (3) Finally, some toxic mechanisms
and pathways that occur in animals may not occur in humans.”) Id.
42
See supra note 33, at 28 (cited in Flue-Cured Tobacco at 4 F. Supp. 2d at 442).
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scientific understanding has often been found to be incomplete, indecisive, and
controversial in attempting to resolve the important questions about the type
and size of specific hazards . . . [and] considerations in risk management—
issues of risk acceptability and how to balance trade-offs among competing
interests—are beyond the technical/scientific debate.”43
B. A More Meaningful Judicial Standard of Review: Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
1. The Majority Opinion
To understand how Daubert applies, we must first examine the
controversy in Daubert. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,44 two
minor children and their parents sued Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, alleging
that the severe birth defects resulted from their mother’s ingestion during
pregnancy of Bendectin, a prescription anti-nausea drug marked by Merrell
Dow. 45 Instead of contesting Merrell Dow’s characterization of the published
record concerning Bendectin, Daubert responded to Merrell Dow’s summary
judgment motion by marshaling eight experts of their own.46 All these experts
concluded that, on the basis of “in vitro” (test tube) and “in vivo” (live) animal
studies, Bendectin can cause birth defects.47 The district court granted Merrell
Dow’s motion for summary judgment on the basis that Merrell Dow’s expert
testimony found there was no scientific study that linked Bendectin to severe
birth defects.48
The court stated that “scientific evidence is admissible only if the
principle upon which it is based is ‘sufficiently established to have general
acceptance in the field to which it belongs.’”49 The court held that petitioners’
43

Id. at 7.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
45
Id. at 579-80.
46
Id. at 583. (These experts had impressive degrees: one had a master’s degree in
biostatistics from Columbia University and a doctorate in statistics from the University of
California at Berkeley, and is chief of the section at the California Department of Health and
Services that determines the causes of birth defects. The other experts had equally
impressive degrees. See Id. at 583, n. 2).
47
Id.
48
Id. (Steven H. Lamm, a physician and an epidemiologist, stated that he had “reviewed all the
literature on Bendectin and human birth defects—more than 30 published studies involving
over 130,000 patients. No study had found Bendectin to be a human teratogen (ie., a
substance capable of causing malformations in fetuses). On the basis of this review, Doctor
Lamm concluded that maternal use of Bendectin during the first trimester of pregnancy has
not been shown to be a risk factor for human birth defects.” Id. at 582.).
49
Id. (After Frye v. United States, 293 F.2d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), was decided in 1923, federal
44
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evidence did not meet this standard. Given the “vast body of epidemiological
data concerning Bendectin, the court held, expert opinion which is not based
on epidemiological evidence is not admissible to establish causation.”50
Petitioners’ epidemiological analyses, the court stated, were ruled to be
“inadmissible because they had not been published to peer review.”51
The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Court stated that “expert opinion based
on a scientific technique is inadmissible unless the technique is ‘generally
accepted’ as reliable in the relevant scientific community.”52 The Court noted
that other Courts of Appeals who had considered the risks of Bendectin had
refused to admit “reanalyses of epidemiological studies that had been neither
published nor subjected to peer review.”53 Those courts that had considered
the risks of Bendectin had found the unpublished reanalyses “particularly
problematic in light of the massive weight of the original published studies
supporting [Dow’s] position, all of which had undergone full scrutiny from the
scientific community.”54 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the evidence
marshaled by petitioners “provided an insufficient foundation to allow admission
of expert testimony that Bendectin caused their injuries, and accordingly, that
petitioners could not satisfy their burden of proving causation at trial.”55
The Supreme Court granted certiorari. It thereafter vacated the lower
court’s decision and held that the Frye “general acceptance” test had been
superseded by the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence.56 The Court
noted that the Frye standard was “austere . . .[,] incompatible with . . . the
Federal Rules of Evidence, [and] should not be applied in federal trials.”57 The
Court then articulated a new test for admissibility of scientific expert testimony
and listed several nonexclusive factors that federal courts should consider
when faced with a proffer of such testimony.58
2. The Daubert Standards

courts required that the expert’s theory be generally accepted within the relevant scientific
community. The Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975 called into question the viability of the
“general acceptance” test. A literal reading of FRE 702 and its legislative history make no
mention of the “general acceptance” test. Daubert finally laid to rest this issue by concluding
that the Federal Rules of Evidence superseded the Frye “general acceptance” test.).
50
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 583-84.
51
Id. at 584.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 585.
56
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588-89 & n.6.
57
Id. at 589.
58
Id. at 592-594.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol33/iss3/2

12

Truong: Daubert and Judicial Review

DAUBERT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW

2000]

In overruling the “general acceptance” test set forth in Frye, the Court
noted that “[t]here is a specific Rule that speaks to the contested issue. Rule
702, governing expert testimony, provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise.
Nothing in the text of this Rule establishes ‘general acceptance’ as an
absolute prerequisite to admissibility. Nor does respondent present any clear
indication that Rule 702 or the Rules as a whole were intended to incorporate a
‘general acceptance’ standard.”59 The Court held that Rule 702, in conjunction
with other Evidence Rules, assigned to the trial court the gate keeping function
of “ensuring that an expert’s testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and
is relevant to the task at hand.”60
The Court added that “[p]ertinent evidence based on scientifically valid
principles” will satisfy these requirements.61 The Daubert Court interpreted
Rule 702 as entrusting a trial judge with the responsibility of ensuring that an
expert is testifying to “(1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact
to understand or determine a fact in issue.”62 The phrase “scientific
knowledge” in Rule 702 requires that “the reasoning or methodology
underlying the testimony [be] scientifically valid.”63 The term “scientific”
signifies “a grounding in the methods and procedures of science,” and
“knowledge” is “more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation.”64 The
requirement of scientific knowledge “establishes a standard of evidentiary
reliability.”65
However, the Daubert Court offered the District Court further guidance.
The Court ventured several general observations as to how to determine
“whether a theory or technique is scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of
fact.”66 In addition to determining whether the methodology underlying the
testimony is scientifically valid, the Court enumerated four nonexclusive factors
59

Id. at 588.
Id. at 597.
61
Id.
62
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592.
63
Id. at 592-593.
64
Id. at 590.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 589.
60
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that trial courts should consider: (1) whether a scientific theory can and has
been tested; (2) whether it has been subjected to peer review; (3) its known or
potential rate of error; and (4) its degree of general acceptance within the
relevant scientific community.67 Second, a judge must determine whether the
proffered evidence “properly can be applied to the facts at issue,” a
characteristic courts call “fit.”68 When evaluating regulations, courts have
considered reliability more important than fit, determining the question of fit as
more appropriately categorized as a question of policy rather than science.69
III. ANALYSIS
A. Review Under The Administrative Procedures Act
Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), courts shall “hold
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . .
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law . . . .”70 Kenneth Davis and Richard Pierce, Jr. note in their
Administrative Law Treatise that “to the extent that the FRE announce any
policy relevant to the rules of evidence (governing administrative law), that
policy is contained in Rule 703.”71 In questioning whether the Federal Rules of
Evidence should even be applied to an administrative agency, at least one
Commentator has accurately noted the following:
Why treat agencies like testifying experts? Mainly because the
analogy is extremely apt. When agencies justify their
regulation of risk to courts, they must offer evidence from the
record to justify their regulatory decisions. The evidence they
offer in support of those regulations will contain, at least in part,
the agency’s assessment of the risk regulated. Agencies must
use risk assessments to lay a foundation for the ultimate
decision they make. In that sense a risk assessment operates
as expert testimony, designed to help the fact finder make the
appropriate determinations of fact . . . [b]ecause “the party
presenting the expert must show that the expert’s findings are
based on sound science,” the agency must provide evidence
from the record justifying its decision . . . [if the risk
67

Id. at 593-594.
Id. at 591-92.
69
See, e.g., In re Paoli Railroad Yard, PCB Litigation, 35 F. 3d 717, 746; see also Cavallo v. Star
Enter., 892 F. Supp. 756, 762 (E.D. Va. 1995) (declined to be followed by Heller v. Shaw Indus.
167 F. 3d 146 (3rd Cir. 1999)).
70
5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (1994); 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(A).
71
KENNETH CULP DAVIS AND RICHARD J. P IERCE , JR., 2 A DMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§§ 10.1-10.3(Little, Brown 3d Ed. 1994).
68
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assessments represent factual judgments], then the court must
determine their admissibility. If they are policy, then the court
must defer to the agency’s judgment.72
In order to fully understand how the Daubert standards might have
resulted in more consistent results upon judicial review of agency decision
making, we must first examine in detail an actual case where the reviewing
court reversed an agency’s decision making under the traditional “substantial
evidence” standard of review. In AFL-CIO v. OSHA,73 the Court held that:
(1) OSHA failed to establish that existing exposure limits in the
workplace presented significant risk of material health
impairment or that new standards eliminated or substantially
lessened the risk; (2) OSHA did not meet its burden of
establishing that its 428 new permissible exposure limits (PEL)
were either economically or technologically feasible; and (3)
there was insufficient explanation in the record to support
across-the-board, four-year delay in implementation of the
rule.74
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) in 1989
issued its Air Contaminants Standard, which is a set of permissible exposure
limits for 428 toxic substances.75 These Air Contaminants Standard were
challenged by petitioners who represented various affected industries and the
AFL-CIO on the grounds that the Standards were promulgated in violation of
the procedural and substantive requirements of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970.76 The Act was adopted “to assure so far as possible every
working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions.”77
The Act, to this end, authorized the Secretary to issue occupational health and
safety standards with which each employer must comply.78 OSHA, pursuant to
that authority, in 1971 promulgated approximately 425 permissible exposure
limits (“PELs”) for air contaminants79 derived primarily from federal standards
applicable to government contractors under the Walsh-Healey Act.80
72

Andrew Trask, Daubert and the EPA: An Evidentiary Approach to Reviewing Agency
Determinations of Risk, 1997 U.CHI.LEGAL.F. 569.
73
American Fed’n of Labor and Congress of Indus. Org. v. Occupational Safety and Health
Admin. U.S. Dept of Labor, 965 F.2d 962 (11th Cir. 1992).
74
Id.
75
Id. at 967.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 968. (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-71; Id. at 651(b)).
78
Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 654, 655).
79
AFL-CIO, 965 F.2d at 968 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1000 (1971)).
80
Id. (citing 41 U.S.C. § 35 (1988)).
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On June 7, 1988, OSHA had published a Notice of Proposed Rule
making for its Air Contaminants Standard in which OSHA, in this single rule
making, proposed to issue new or revised PELs for over 400 substances.81 On
January 19, 1989, OSHA then issued its revised Air Contaminants Standard for
428 toxic substances, and established a four-year period for which employers
could come into compliance with the new standard using engineering and work
practice controls.82 Petitioners contend that “OSHA’s use of generic findings,
the lumping together of so many substances in one rule making, and the short
time provided for comment by interested parties, combine to create a record
inadequate to support this massive new set of PELs.”83
1. Substantial Evidence Standard of Review: the Traditional Test.
The Court cited Section 6(f) of the OSH Act which provides that “the
determinations of the Secretary shall be conclusive if supported by substantial
evidence in the record considered as a whole.”84 “Substantial evidence,” the
Court noted, “is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion . . . [and under this test] . . . we must take a
‘harder look’ at OSHA’s action than we would if we were reviewing the action
under the more deferential arbitrary and capricious standard applicable to
agencies governed by the Administrative Procedure Act.”85
The substantial evidence test applies “to review of policy decisions as
well as factual determinations86 even though policy decisions are ‘not so
susceptible to verification or refutation by the record.’”87 Furthermore, the
Court stated, “the validity of an agency’s determination must be judged on the
basis of the agency’s stated reasons for making that determination.”88 Section
6(e) of the OSH Act provides that “whenever the Secretary promulgates any
standard . . . he shall include a statement of the reasons for such action, which
shall be published in the Federal Register.”89
81

Id. at 969.
Id.
83
Id. at 971.
84
Id. at 969 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (1998)).
85
AFL-CIO, 965 F.2d at 970. See American Textile Mfrs. Inst. Inc., v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490,
522 (1981) (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951)).
86
Id. (citing Texas Indep. Ginners Ass’n v. Marshall, 630 F.2d 398, 404 (5th Cir. 1980)).
87
Id. (quoting American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493, 497 (5th Cir. 1978)).
88
Id. (citing Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 631
n.31 (1980) (hereinafter “Benzene” case).
89
Id. at 970 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 655(e) (1998). (“In that statement of reasons, the agency must
pinpoint the factual evidence and the policy considerations upon which it relied. This
requires explication of the assumptions underlying predictions or extrapolations, and of the
82
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2. Significant Risk of Material Impairment of Health
Under this standard, the Court examined whether OSHA fulfilled its
statutory mandate. Under Section 3(8) of the OSH Act, “occupational health
and safety standard” is defined as “a standard which requires conditions, or
the adoption or use of one or more practices, means, methods, operations, or
processes, reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful
employment and places of employment.”90 The reviewing court noted that the
Supreme Court has interpreted this provision “to require that, before the
promulgation of any permanent health standard, OSHA make a threshold
finding that a significant risk of material health impairment exists at the current
levels of exposure to the toxic substances in question91 and that a new, lower
standard is therefore ‘reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or
healthful employment and places of employment.’”92
The Court also noted that “OSHA ultimately bears the burden of
proving by substantial evidence that such a risk exists and that the proposed
standard is necessary . . . [but that] . . . the agency has no duty to calculate the

basis for its resolution of conflicts and ambiguities. In enforcing these requirements, the
court does not reach out to resolve controversies over technical data. Instead, it seeks to
ensure public accountability.” Id. at 970-71. See AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d at 651.).
90
Id. at 972 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1998)).
91
Id. (citing Benzene, 448 U.S. at 614-615.).
92
AFL-CIO, 965 F.2d at 972-3 (citing Benzene, 448 U.S. at 615.) (“Once OSHA finds that a
significant risk of material health impairment exists at current exposure levels for a given toxic
substance, any standard promulgated to address that risk must then comply with the
requirements of section 6(b)(5) of the OSH Act” which provides that the agency:
[i]n promulgating standards dealing with toxic materials or harmful
physical agents under this subsection, shall set the standard which
most adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the
best available evidence, that no employee will suffer material
impairment of health or functional capacity even if such employee
has regular exposure to the hazard dealt with by such standard for
the period of his working life. Development of standards under this
subsection shall be based upon research, demonstrations,
experiments, and such other information as may be appropriate. In
addition to the attainment of the highest degree of health and safety
protection for the employee, other considerations shall be the latest
available scientific data in the field, the feasibility of the standards,
and experience gained under this and other health and safety laws.
Whenever practicable, the standard promulgated shall be expressed
in terms of objective criteria and of the performance desired.
Id. (emphasis added) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1998)).
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exact probability of harm or to support its finding that a significant risk exists
with anything approaching scientific certainty.”93 Although the Court found
OSHA’s explanation with respect to its determination of what constitute
“material impairments” as being “adequately explained and supported in the
record,”94 the Court had trouble with the agency’s determination of risk with
respect to each individual substance.95 The Court stated that “[n]o one could
reasonably expect OSHA to adopt some precise estimate of fatalities likely from
a given exposure level, and indeed the Supreme Court has said that the
agency has ‘no duty to calculate the exact probability of harm.’”96
However, the Court continued, OSHA “has a responsibility to quantify or
explain, at least to some reasonable degree, the risk posed by each toxic
substance regulated.”97 Without doing so, “OSHA has not demonstrated, and
this court cannot evaluate, how serious the risk is for any particular substance,
or whether any workers will in fact benefit from the new standard for any
particular substance.”98 Instead of attempting to estimate the risk of
contracting the adverse health effects caused by the exposure at various levels
of individual substances, OSHA “merely provided a conclusory statement that
the new PEL will reduce the ‘significant’ risk of material health effects shown to
be caused by that substance.”99
The Court concluded that “[i]n most cases, OSHA cited a few studies
and then established a PEL without explaining why the studies mandated the
particular PEL chosen. For example, the PEL for bismuth telluride appears to
be based on a single study that showed almost no effects of any kind in
animals at several times that concentration . . . [and] . . . [s]imilarly, the PEL for
ferrovanadium dust was based on pulmonary changes at exposure levels many
hundreds of times higher than OSHA’s new standard.”100 In some cases,
“OSHA merely repeated a boilerplate finding that the new limit would protect
workers from significant risk of some material health impairment.”101 The Court
noted that while its deference to agency decisionmaking is at its peak when an
agency’s choices “are among scientific predictions, we must still look for some

93

Id. (citing Benzene, 448 U.S. at 655-656).
Id. at 975.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 975. (quoting Benzene, 448 U.S. at 655).
97
Id.
98
AFL-CIO, 965 F.2d at 975.
99
Id.
100
Id. at 976. (the Court also noted that the same was true for iron pentacarbonyl; cesium
hydroxide, iron salts; ethylene dichloride; and sulfur tetrafluoride.).
101
Id.
94
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articulation of reasons for those choices.”102 The Court made the following
observation:
Explicit explanation for the basis of the agency’s decision not
only facilitates proper judicial review but also provides the
opportunity for effective peer review, legislative oversight, and
public education. This requirement is in the best interest of
everyone, including the decision-makers themselves. If the
decision-making process is open and candid, it will inspire more
confidence in those who are affected. Further, by opening the
process to public scrutiny and criticism, we reduce the risk that
important information will be overlooked or ignored.103
The Court continued by stating that “[m]ere conclusory statements,
such as those made throughout the Air Contaminants Standard, are simply
inadequate to support a finding of significant risk of material health
impairment.”104 In explaining why it set standards where a significant risk of
material health impairment remains, OSHA reasoned “that the time and
resource constraints of attempting to promulgate an air contaminants standard
of this magnitude prevented detailed analysis of these substances.”105 The
Court noted that “[t]he agency’s response to this criticism [was]
unpersuasive.”106
The Court found “OSHA’s use of safety factors in this rule making
problematic” because “first, OSHA’s use of safety factors in this rule making is
very similar to the approach criticized by the Supreme Court in Benzene.107
102

Id. (citing International Union United Auto, Aerospace and Agr. Implement Workers of
America, UAW v. Pendergras, 878 F.2d 389, 392 (1989)).
103
Id. at 976 (citing AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 651-52 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
104
AFL-CIO, 965 F.2d at 976.
105
Id.
106
Id. at 977. (The Court further pointed out that “[d]ose response models have often been
used in the quantitative assessment of the risks associated with exposures to carcinogenic
substances. However, less scientific effort has been devoted to models to be used with noncarcinogenic substances. Mathematically precise methods to establish the true no-effect
level or to define the dose-response curves have not been developed for most of the more
than 400 substances involved in this rule making. Most of the scientific work that has been
done was designed to identify lowest observed effect or no-effect levels for a variety of acute
effects . . . It is possible to use these data, combined with professional judgement and
OSHA’s expertise and experience, to determine that significant risk exists at current levels of
exposure and that a reduction in these levels will substantially reduce this risk of material
impairment of health.” Id.).
107
Id. at 978. (The Court made the following observation: “[f]rom OSHA’s description, safety
factors are used to lower the standard below levels at which the available evidence shows no
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Second, even assuming that the use of safety factors is permissible under the
Act and Benzene, application of such factors without explaining the method by
which they were determined, as was done in this case, is clearly not
permitted.”108 The Court observed that “[t]he Supreme Court in Benzene did
recognize that absolute scientific certainty may be impossible when regulating
on the edge of scientific knowledge, and that ‘so long as they are supported by
a body of reputable scientific thought, the Agency is free to use conservative
assumptions . . ., risking error on the side of overprotection rather than
underprotection.’”109
However, the Court continued, “[t]he lesson of Benzene is clearly that
OSHA may use assumptions, but only to the extent that those assumptions
have some basis in reputable scientific evidence. If the agency is concerned
that the standard should be more stringent than even a conservative
interpretation of the existing evidence supports, monitoring and medical testing
may be done to accumulate the additional evidence needed to support that
more protective limit.”110 Overall, the Court noted, “OSHA’s use of safety
factors in this rule making was not adequately explained by this rule making
record.”111 The Court concluded that:
It is clear that the analytical approach used by OSHA in
promulgating its revised Air Contaminants Standard is so
flawed that it cannot stand . . . The result of this approach is a
set of 428 inadequately supported standards. OSHA has
lumped together substances and affected industries and
provided such inadequate explanation that it is virtually
impossible for a reviewing court to determine if sufficient
evidence supports the agency’s conclusions.112
Therefore, the Court concluded, “although we find that the record
adequately explains and supports OSHA’s determination that the health effects

significant risk of material health impairment because of the possibility that the evidence is
incorrect or incomplete; ie., OSHA essentially makes an assumption that the existing evidence
does not adequately show the extent of the risk. That may be a correct assumption, but
beyond a general statement that the use of safety factors is common in the scientific
community, OSHA did not indicate how the existing evidence for individual substances was
inadequate to show the extent of the risk from those substances. Such a rationale is very
reminiscent of the ‘benefits are likely to be appreciable’ rationale rejected in Benzene as
insufficient to satisfy the agency’s obligations under the OSH Act.” Id. (emphasis added)).
108
Id.
109
Id. at 978-79. (citing Benzene, 448 U.S. at 656).
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id. at 986.
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of exposure to these 428 substances are material impairments, we hold that
OSHA has not sufficiently explained or supported its threshold determination
that exposure to these substances at previous levels posed a significant risk of
these material health impairments or that the new standard eliminates or
reduces that risk to the extent feasible. OSHA’s overall approach to this
rulemaking is so flawed that we must vacate the whole revised Air
Contaminants Standard.”113
B. Review Under the Daubert Standards.
Currently, a reviewing court is required to determine whether the
agencies’ proposed admission of evidence into the record rests on “substantial
evidence.”114 A reviewing court’s subjective idea of what “substantial evidence”
may or may not entail is the quintessential problem that Daubert addresses.
By using the Daubert standards, the Court is not second-guessing the
agency’s decision making, but is simply ensuring, as it is already required to do
under the “substantial evidence” test, that the evidence relied upon by the
agency meets the same threshold requirements that a federal litigant is already
subjected to. If the Daubert factors were not used by a reviewing court, the
plaintiff is placed in the awkward position of challenging an agency decision to
meet evidentiary standards that the agency itself could ignore.
1. How Did OSHA Determine “Significant Risk” in AFL-CIO?
The Court concluded that “OSHA’s discussions of individual substances
generally contain no quantification or explanation of the risk from that individual
substance.”115 The individual substances were simply summarized discussions
of various studies and the concomitant health effects found at various levels of
exposure to that substance.116 If the Daubert standards were applied here, the
reviewing court would have to ask: 1) Is the agency relying on scientific
knowledge?, and 2) Will the scientific knowledge assist the reviewing court to
understand or determine a fact in issue?117 Again, according to the Daubert
Court, the phrase “scientific knowledge” in Rule 702 requires that the
reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony [be] scientifically valid.”118
The term “scientific” signifies “a grounding in the methods and procedures of
113

Id. at 986-87.
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1994). See also National Coalition Against the Misuse of Pesticides v.
EPA, 867 F.2d 636, 642 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“[T]he Administrator satisfies his burden of
production by proffering ‘substantial evidence’ of harm from respected scientific sources.”).
115
American Fed’n of Labor and Congress of Indus. Org. v. Occupational Safety and Health
Admin. U.S. Dept of Labor, 965 F.2d 962,975 (11th Cir. 1992).
116
Id.
117
See supra note 44, Section II.B.1, and accompanying text.
118
See supra note 63.
114
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science,” and “knowledge” is “more than subjective belief or unsupported
speculation.”119 The requirement of scientific knowledge “establishes a
standard of evidentiary reliability.”120
Whether a theory or technique is scientific knowledge that will assist a
reviewing court will depend on four nonexclusive factors: 1) whether a scientific
theory can and has been tested; 2) whether it has been subjected to peer
review; 3) its potential rate of error; and 4) its degree of general acceptance
within the relevant scientific community.121
In the case of AFL-CIO, the Court determined that “the individual
substance discussions in the Air Contaminants Standard are virtually devoid of
reasons for setting those individual standards [with respect to assessing the
level at which significant risk of harm is eliminated or substantially reduced].”122
In most cases, the Court concluded, “OSHA cited a few studies and then
established a PEL (permissible exposure limits) without explaining why the
studies mandated the particular PEL chosen. For example, the PEL for
bismuth telluride appears to be based on a single study that showed almost no
effects of any kind in animals at several times that concentration.”123 For some
substances, the Court noted, “OSHA merely repeated a boilerplate finding that
the new limit would protect workers from significant risk of some material health
impairment. For example, OSHA did not cite any studies whatsoever for its
aluminum welding fume standard or its vegetable oil standard.”124
In determining whether the agency has met its “substantial evidence”
burden, the court simply concludes that “[m]ere conclusory statements, such as
those made throughout the Air Contaminants Standard, are simply inadequate
to support a finding of significant risk of material health impairment.”125 Instead
of noting the conclusory nature of the Administrator’s findings, the Court could
have provided a more meaningful judicial review, and concurrently, provided
the agency with guidance as to the requisite level of review for future
challenges of its decision making. For instance, here, the Court could have
asked if the single study that OSHA relied upon for bismuth telluride was
subjected to peer review, whether it was tested and repeated, what its potential
rate of error was, and whether it was generally accepted in the relevant
scientific community (which may or may not include other agency scientists).
119

See supra note 64.
See supra note 65.
121
See supra note 67.
122
American Fed’n of Labor and Congress of Indus. Org. v. Occupational Safety and Health
Admin. U.S. Dept of Labor, 965 F.2d 962, 976 (11th Cir. 1992).
123
Id.at 976.
124
Id.
125
Id.
120
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The same could be asked with respect to the agency’s “boilerplate
finding that the new (PEL) limit would protect workers from significant risk of
some material health impairment.”126 From what were these “boilerplate
findings” derived from? Could they reasonably be characterized as 1) scientific
knowledge that 2) would assist the reviewing court to understand or determine
a fact in issue (here, to what extent would the boilerplate findings be
reasonably related to significant risk of some material health impairment)? Do
these basic findings meet the requirement of scientific knowledge, insofar as it
“establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability”?127 In short, the court in AFLCIO could have provided clearer guidance to the lower courts if it had followed
the guidelines set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in Daubert. Without strictly
adhering to the standards of judicial review in Daubert,128 reasoned judicial
decision making was substituted for discretionary review.
IV. PROPOSAL
Under the current law, a reviewing court may either reverse an
agency’s decision making under the “clearly erroneous” test if it “is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”129 However,
under the “substantial evidence test,” a reviewing court may not reverse if a
“reasonable person could have reached the same conclusion as the agency.
This is the standard used by a federal court of appeals in reviewing the
findings of a jury (or by a trial court in taking a matter from the jury.).”130
Unfortunately, both these standards come up short when the agency decision
makers are relying on complex, and technically difficult, scientific evidence.
Courts are more likely to defer to an administrative agency’s decision making
when it deems that the scientific data is within the expertise of the
administrative agency (read: beyond the scope of the judicial review).
Although most commentators would concede that some scientific issues
are so complex that they should be left to the specific agencies whose task is to
specifically examine the evidence and present their findings to the reviewing
court,131 this analysis misses the point. The issue is not whether the information
is scientifically complex, because most of the times it is, indeed, complex. The
real issue, however, and the real challenge with respect to a reasoned judicial
decision making, is whether the agency’s actions—regarding risk assessment,
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interpretive judgments, or scientific paradigms—are defensible, appropriate,
and scientifically valid. The Daubert standards enable a reviewing court to
bring structure, validity, and reliability to the agency decision making process.
V. CONCLUSION
In order to avoid the inconsistencies that have developed when courts
review agency decision making, and in order to decrease the costs of
excessive health regulations by agencies, reviewing courts should subject the
agency decision maker to the exact same standards a federal litigant is
subjected to when he or she proposes to admit scientific testimony: namely,
the Daubert standards. Only by holding the agency decision makers to a
higher standard will the courts avoid being labeled a mere rubber stamp for
environmental policy decision makers.
Environmental risk regulation remains a priority for the United States.
Until a specialized federal judiciary is created with respect to scientific decision
making, a sitting court must continue to establish clear guidelines in order to
determine the validity of an agency’s decision making process. Therefore, only
by applying the Daubert standards in the agency review process will courts
ensure that the environmental regulations are based on falsifiable, valid, and
reliable scientific evidence. In keeping the regulatory decision making
scientific, Daubert enables courts to make it more effective.
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